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THE MYTH OF THE "LOAN RECEIPT"
REVISITED UNDER RULE 17(a)
SErarHEN S. BoN *
The rather turbulent judicial and legislative history, which
produced the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has appropriately
resulted in general approval from all levels of the legal profes-
sion. Although the rules are designed to regulate only practice
and procedure and not to "abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right,"2 it is clear that the penumbra between procedure
and substance shall continue to be a battleground for producing
debate and court interpretations which will shape new contours
in substantive law. The following discussion is oriented toward
an area of substantive law which should be more of a gray area
than has been presently established by the real party in interest
controversy in construing the intent and purpose of Rule 11(a).3
This rule, like others,4 has not been free of conflicting interpre-
tation, but the prevailing general rule is that the "real party in
interest" is the party who by substantive law possessses the right
to be enforced. 5 The purposes of this article are to analyze the
* LL.B. 1965, University of South Carolina; associate, Hogan & Hartson,
Washington, D. C.
1. FLEMING, CIVIL PaocEDuRE (1965); BARoN & HOLTZOFp, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4-6 (Wright ed. 1960); Clark, Two Decades of the
Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 435 (1958); Holtzoff, Origin and
Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1057 (1955).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
3. This rule states:
Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest; but an executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a con-
tract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by
statute may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for
whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute of the United
States so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be
brought in the name of the United States.
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
4. E.g., Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co., 351 U.S.
445 (1956) (Rule 54(b) as amended); Mississippi Pub. Co. v. Murphee, 326
U.S. 438 (1946) (Rule 4(f)); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (Rule
35 (a)).
5. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Perry, 322 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 984 (1964); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v.
Newton, 241 F. Supp. 259 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Eastman Kodak Co. v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 34 F.R.D. 490 (D. Md. 1964); Sigma Eng'r Ser. Inc.
v. Halm Instrument Co., 33 F.R.D. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). "Its meaning per-
haps would be more accurately expressed if it read: An action shall be prose-
cuted in the name of the party who, by the substantive law, has the right to
be enforced," Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems
Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 564 (1937). Cf. Atkinson,
The Real Party In Interest Rule: A Plea for Its Abolition, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv.
926 (1957).
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narrow issue of the loan receipt method, whereby insurers settle
claims with insureds, and to explore the resulting question of
who is the real party in interest when suit is brought against the
alleged wrongdoer.
This rule or a similar rule under state procedure would nor-
mally require an insurance company to be joined as a real party
in interest to the extent of its payments to the insured for any
loss under the policy.6 However, a technique has been developed
whereby an insurer makes a loan to the insured which is to be
repaid in the event there is recovery from a third person. Insur-
ers settle the claim for damages by advancing the claimed amount
as a loan, evidenced by a printed "loan receipt" and signed by
the person receiving the money. Customarily, the loan receipt
states that the amount paid by the insurer is a loan on which
the recipient does not pay interest and which is to be repaid only
in the event and to the extent that recovery is had from the
tort-feasor. Further, the receipt ordinarily provides that the
recipient of the funds shall institute an action in his own name
against the third person allegedly responsible for the loss but
that such action shall be prosecuted under the exclusive direc-
tion, control and expense of the person "loaning" the money.
A major inquiry is whether such an arrangement under the
name of "loan receipt" should be considered in law as a payment
or as a loan. Under a "payment" theory the insurer would prop-
erly be regarded as a real party in interest under Federal Rule
17(a). Under a pure "loan" theory, however, courts have main-
tained that the insurer would not necessarily be considered a real
party in interest and could successfully resist any attempt to be
brought into an action.
There are several reasons why an insurer would prefer to
make a loan rather than a payment. The primary purpose is to
avoid subrogation and thus evade the procedural process of be-
coming a formal party to an action against a tort-feasor or other
person liable for the loss or damage. Insurers and courts are
reluctant to have a jury learn of the presence of an insurance
company in the litigation because of supposed prejudice against
6. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949); Link
Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 325 F2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Virginia Elec. &
Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 186 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1951); National
Cordova Corp. v. City of Memphis, 214 Tenn. 371, 380 S.W2d 793 (1964);
Gardner v. Walker, 373 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 1962) ; Cf. Catalfano v. Higgens, 188
A.2d 357 (Del. 1962). (The court stated that the adoption of the equivalent
of Rule 17(a) had not changed the prior state law permitting suit by an
insured who had no interest.)
19661
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the insurers. However, the question in this discussion is whether
the loan receipt method should be procedurally permitted, or in
view of the real intent of the parties regarding the transaction,
should be ignored thereby fully recognizing the procedural pur-
poses embodied in the real party in interest provisions of Rule
17(a).
Leading legal authorities have summarily considered the ques-
tion without discussion. According to Moore, the insurer is not
a real party in interest when such a loan agreement exists. "An
insurer which has merely made a 'loan' to an insured, to be repaid
out of any recovery from a third party, is not a real party in
interest in an action by the insured against a third party.
17
Similarly, Barron and Holtzoff state that "instead of paying the
loss, the insurer makes a loan to the insured under an agreement
whereby the loan is to be repaid only out of any recovery which
may be obtained against a third person, the insured and not the
insurer is the real party in interest and entitled to sue the third
person."8
The development of the loan receipt and the case law testing
its efficacy was due to an effort by carriers on one hand and
insurers on the other to cast upon the other the burden of bearing
the loss caused by the damage or destruction of goods. In order
to escape the burden of bearing the loss, carriers inserted in their
bills of lading a provision that in case of loss or damage to goods
shipped, a carrier is to have the benefit of any insurance effected
on them. Consequently, a payment by an insurer to the shipper
would discharge, pro tanto, the latter's claim against the carrier.
Such claim of the shipper would be discharged, and there would
be no right of subrogation by the insurer upon payment of a loss
of the shipper's right against the carrier. Insurers conceived an
arrangement to relieve them, at least partially, of their liability
for a loss of insured property brought about by the negligence
of a carrier. The insurer would make a loan to the insured, pend-
ing settlement with the carrier, upon the contingency that the
insured would be repaid only to the extent of any subsequent
recovery obtained from the carrier.
The landmark case of Luckenbal v. W. J. Mc6ahan Sugar
Ref. Co.0 permitted the "loan receipt method" of insurance to
7. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACICE § 17.09, at 1349 (2d ed. 1964).
8. 2 BAIRON & HOLT=OFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE § 482, at 23
(Wright ed. 1961).
9. 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
[Vol. 18
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be firmly -established as being "creditable to the ingenuity of
businessmen that an arrangement should have been devised which
is consonant both with the needs of commerce and the demands
of justice."10 In this case a bill of lading contained a provision
that the carrier should have the full benefit of insurance effected
on the goods. However, the policy issued to the shipper con-
tained a provision11 excluding liability by the insurer for goods
shipped under a bill of lading that gave the carrier the benefit of
any insurance. After a loss, an agreement was made between the
insured and the insurer to the effect that the insurer would
make a loan to the shipper covering the loss, repayable only to
the extent of any subsequent net recovery against the carrier.
The insurer would have the control of the litigation against the
carrier which the shipper agreed to institute. The Court held
that such a transaction was a valid loan and did not constitute a
payment which inured to the carrier's benefit. It lauded the pur-
pose of such an agreement and speaking through Mr. Justice
Brandeis, stated:
Agreements of this nature have been a common practice
in business for many years. [citations omitted] It is clear
that if valid and enforced according to their terms, they ac-
complish the desired purpose. They supply the shipper
promptly with money to the full extent of the indemnity or
compensation to which he is entitled on account of the loss;
and they preserve to the insurers the claim against the car-
rier to which by the general law of insurance, independently
of special agreement, they would become subrogated upon
payment by them of the loss. The carrier insists that the
transaction, while in terms a loan, is in substance a payment
of insurance; that to treat it as if it were a loan, is to follow
the letter of the agreement and to disregard the actual facts;
and that to give it effect as a loan is to sanction fiction and
subterfuge. But no good reason appears either for question-
ing its legality or for denying its effeet.12
The Luckenbaoh case has had an unfortunate influence and
long-range effect on the courts and has been consistently cited
not only to support the validity of loan receipts, but also to hold
that the insurer is never the real party in interest when such a
10. Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139, 149 (1918).
11. Id. at 146.
12. Id. at 148. (Emphasis added and citation omitted.)
:Lb66]
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method is employed by the parties. Since Eri R.R. v. Tomp-
kinm18 it is a matter of state law whether the loan receipt is evi-
dence of a true loan.' 4 If it is determined under the state law
that the loan receipt evidences a true loan transaction, then the
insurer has not "paid" the insured's claim and is not a subrogee
who, under the applicable federal procedural law, is required to
prosecute an action for recovery of the claim in its own name as
a real party in interest. The majority of states have followed the
principle established in Luokenbach either as a matter of law or
under a particular factual pattern.1 5 Consequently, federal courts
have consistently avoided the intent of Rule 17(a) and have
blithely applied the controlling state law on the subject.'8
13. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14. Tyler v. Dowell, 274 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
812 (1960).
15. Martin v. McLeod, 241 S.C. 71, 127 S.E.2d 129 (1962) ; Waumbec Mills,
Inc. v. Bahnson Ser. Co., 103 N.H. 461, 174 A2d 839 (1961); Glancy v.
Ragsdale, 25 Ia. 793, 102 N.W.2d 890 (1960); Sun Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
169 Neb. 94, 98 N.W.2d 692 (1959) ; Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 250
N.C. 351, 108 S.E.2d 618 (1959); Ratciff v. Smith, 298 S.W2d 18 (Ky.
1957); Furrer v. Yew Creek Logging Co., 206 Ore. 251, 292 P.2d 499 (1956);
Gould v. Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1952); Klukas v. Yount, 121 Ind. App.
160, 98 N.E.2d 227 (1951) ; Gillies v. Michigan Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 98
Cal. App. 2d 743 221 P.2d 272 (1950); Blair v. Espeland, 231 Minn. 444, 43
N.W.2d 274 (1950); Phillips v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 204 S.C. 496, 30 S.E.2d 146
(1944).
16. Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp. v. Lawson, 271 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Celanese Corp. of Am. v. John Clark Indus.,
214 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1954); Dixey v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co.,
132 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1942); Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Wood, 131 F.2d 541
(5th Cir. 1942); The Plow City, 122 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 798 (1942) ; First Nat'l Bank of Ottawa v. Lloyd's of London, 116 F.2d
221 (7th Cir. 1940); Automobile Ins. Co. v. Springfield Dyeing Co., 109 F.2d
533 (3d Cir. 1940); Watsontown Brick Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 201 F.
Supp, 343 (M.D. Pa. 1962); Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. Coast Mfg. & Sup.
Co., 185 F. Supp. 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Miller v. Pine Bluff Hotel Co., 170
F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Ark. 1959), afd, 286 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1961); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. CO., 131 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y.1955); Capo v. C-O Two Fire Equip. Co., 93 F. Supp. 4 (D.N . 1950); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Henry DuBois Sons Co., 53 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd,
144 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 797 (1945); Perrera v.
Smolowitz, 11 F.R.D. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Merriman v. Cities Serv. Gas
Co., 11 F.R.D. 165 (S.D. Mo. 1951); Yale Transp. Corp. v. Yellow Truck
& Coach Mfg. Co., 3 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Kerna v. Trucking, Inc., 3
F.R.D. 365 (WD. Pa. 1944); cf. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 72 N. Mex. 163, 381 P.2d 675 (1963), where the inmirer filed
suit when a loan receipt was present. The defendants moved to dismiss, stating
the insurer was not the real party in interest. At the pretrial conference the
insureds were joined as party plaintiffs, and after a directed verdict in favor
of the defendants, the insurer appealed. The defendants moved to dismiss on
the grounds that the insurers were not real parties in interest so they could
not appeal and that since the insureds did not appeal, the judgment was final.
Holding that the insurer was the "party aggrieved," the court did not reach the
question whether they were real parties in interest and permitted the insureds
to be added on appeal.
[Vol. 18
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Insurers who become subrogees of the rights of their insureds
by the payment of claims are real parties in interest, who under
the intent of Rule 17(a) must prosecute actions to recover the
amount of such claims in their own names. In United States v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,17 the Federal Tort Claims Act' s was con-
strued as providing for the prosecution of tort claims against the
United States for wrongful acts or wrongful death in connection
with the federal statute which prohibited transfers and assign-
ments of such claims, except assignments made as payment of
the claim.19 The Court held that an insurer-subrogee, such as
an insurance company which had been subrogated wholly or in
part by payment to an insured upon a claim arising under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, qualifies as the real party in interest
under the meaning and intent of Rule 17(a). Further, an insurer
who has paid only part of the loss suffered by the insured may
bring suit alone as the real party in interest and is not required
to bring suit in the name of the insured for his own use and for
the use of the insurance company. If the insurance company has
paid the entire loss, it may bring suit alone as the real party in
interest.
This case has been virtually ignored in applying the general
principles of subrogation to loan receipt problems. Rather, courts
still turn to Lu~ckenbaoh to find support for sidestepping the real
party in interest question. It is submitted that the Luckenbach
case has been a legal crutch of questionable authority for sup-
porting the doctrine that in every case of an advance under a
loan receipt, the "advance" is a loan and not a payment. It should
be emphasized initially that the case was decided on the principle
of Swift v. Tyson2o under the concept of a federal common law.
Justice Brandeis himself wiped out the authority of that case
and many others in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,21 which held that
there is no federal common law and that on a non-federal ques-
tion the controlling substantive law is the law of the state.
A second point of no light significance is the factual pattern
of Luckenbach. The interconnected features of the Lulokenbalz
case are readily apparent and clearly distinguish it from the
typical loan receipt method. In Luokenbac the insurer's liability
17. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671.
19. 31 U.S.C. § 203.
20. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1966]
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was contingent. No liability was present without the non-liability
of the carrier being first established. Therefore, the loan agree-
ment was resorted to by the parties to insure prompt payment
because of the contingency clause. Further, the purpose of the
loan receipt in Luckenbach was to resolve the conflict between
the carriers and insurers in their efforts to sidestep liability for
a loss. This latter question is not an issue in the typical loan
receipt transaction today. Most loan agreement methods concern
arrangements where the insurer is absoluteZy, not contingentZy,
liable for a loss, and the insured is promptly recompensed for the
loss. Unfortunately, few courts have taken the steps necessary
to view the Luckenbach case in its proper perspective:
(a) The facts of the case under consideration as compared
to the Luokenbach case, and
(b) The intention of the parties in each case under con-
sideration as compared to the Luckenbach case.
It is significant that many courts which cite or quote the Luck-
enbaci case as authority for the validity of loan receipt transac-
tions omit the following quotation which should be the keystone
to the validity of the loan receipt. "Whether the transfer of
money or other thing shall operate as payment is ordinarily a
matter which is determined by the intention of the parties to the
transaction."122
Some courts have taken steps to pierce the veil of the loan
receipt when either the factual pattern patently reveals the true
intent of the parties or the factual pattern cannot possibly be
turned into a loan receipt scheme. In McNeil Constr. Co. v.
Livingston ,State Ban623 an action in debt was brought by a
depositor against a bank for sums paid from the depositor's
account to a former employee of the depositor on forged checks.
The depositor had been reimbursed for the loss by a fidelity
bondsman and had given a receipt for a "loan," repayable only
on a condition of recovery by the depositor. In interpreting Mon-
tana law the district court24 rendered summary judgment for
the bank and held that when the depositor had been paid, he had
no interest left in his claim against the bank and that the remit-
tance was not a loan but a payment. The circuit court affirmed
22. Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139, 149 (1918).
23. 300 F2d 88 (9th Cir. 1962).
24. McNeil Constr. Co. v. Livingston State Bank, 185 F. Supp. 197 (D.
Mont. 1960), affd, 300 F2d 88 (9th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 18
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the decision noting that although the bank had made a motion
to bring in the insurer as a party plaintiff, it apparently waived
it by taking summary judgment. Further, the court stated that
the district court might well have brought in the insurer instead
of the insured on its own motion after it concluded the wrong
party had brought suit. Since the appellant did not assign such
failure as error, the court did not reach the point. The circuit
court expressed reluctance in its holding by laconically stating
that "while we may regret the result, it seems unavoidable....,
When New York substantive law was applied in Rosenfeld v.
Continental Bldg. Operating Co.,26 the court held that the pay-
ment of a loss even though evidenced by a loan receipt would not
constitute payment unless the policy so providedY.2 Consequently,
there could not be a subsequent loan agreement as in Luclenbach.
In Condor Iv. Co. v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling C0.28 an
action was brought by the insured for fire loss allegedly due to
the defendant's negligence, and the defendant filed a plea in
abatement. The law of Oregon supported the validity of loan
agreements.2 9 The defendant contended that where the insurance
policy makes no provision for the loan of the amount of the
claim in lieu of direct payment and subrogation, any loan agree-
ment which might be signed by the insurer and the insured would
be of no consequence. This would be particularly true where pay-
ment of the loss is required by the state statute. The defendant
relied upon the Rosenfeld case as supporting this position. Stat-
ing that if the question had never been decided in Oregon, the
Rosenfeld case would be followed, the court held that "these loan
receipts negotiated and executed after the insured and insurers
had agreed on settlements, constituted nothing more than shams
and subterfuges which entirely misrepresented the real nature of
the agreements."30 As indicated, Oregon had previously held
that the loan agreements are valid even though the policy makes
25. McNeil Constr. Co. v. Livingston State Bank, 300 F.2d 88, 91 (9th Cir.
1962).
26. 135 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Mo: 1955).
27. New York now has a statute which provides that the insurer under a loan
receipt method need not be joined. N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN., Civil Practice
Law & Rules § 1004 (1963). Since this applies only to actions instituted in the
courts of New York, the Circuit Court applied the case law of New York.
28. 211 F. Supp. 671 (D. Ore. 1962).
29. See Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d
110 (1959), 346 P.2d 643 (1959).
30. Condor Inv. Co. v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 211 F. Supp. 671,
674 (D. Ore. 1962). (Emphasis added.)
1966]
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no provision for the loan. Consequently, while recognizing the
merit of the defendant's position, the court could not support it.
The court destroyed the validity of the loan receipt agree-
ment in this case by disregarding the policy language and di-
rectly considering the real intention of the parties. In an enlight-
ened opinion which probed the parties' real intent, the court
concluded that the insurers were the real parties in interest in the
suit since the checks, proofs of loss and loan receipts signed by
the insured and issued to various insurers indicated the intention
to consider the loan receipts as full payment of the claims. These
facts also made it "quite clear that plaintiff and the insurance
companies were engaged in the settlement of all claims as part
and parcel of one transaction."3 1 Although the printed language
on the checks issued by one of the insurance companies, "Being
in full settlement of," was obliterated and the language, "Adv.
as loan," was substituted therefor, the drafts clearly showed that
the money paid was on the particular policy under a particular
policy number. The other drafts were unaltered, and "there is
no doubt that these were given in full settlement of the fire claim,
and not as a loan."3 2 All of the drafts were delivered to the
plaintiff at the same time, endorsed and accepted by the plaintiff,
and deposited in its bank account. The money was shortly
checked out in full payment of the contractor's charges for repair
of the fire loss. No entry of debt was made on the plaintiff's
books. Finally, although the loan receipts recite the actual receipt
of a specific sum of money, no money was advanced until after
the proofs of loss under the policies had been received. Since
the amounts claimed in the proof of loss were exactly the same
as the amount of the loss, "it is quite clear that the check was
issued in connection with the proof of loss."38'
In analyzing these facts, the court properly concluded that the
insured did not treat the transaction as a loan, as evidenced by
the fact that when the money was received, no entry of debt was
on its books. The insurer did not consider it a loan, and in at
least three instances drafts were issued which recited that they
were in full and complete settlement of the loan and therefore
were a payment under a particular proof of loss. The "loan"
was correctly labeled as a payment since "the parties to these
instruments never actually intended the transaction as loans
31. Ibid.
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but . . . intended that the drafts should be accepted as full
payment of their claims under the insurance policies."34
It would seem that this reasoning is extremely sound and evi-
dences the true nature of most loan receipts. The insurer usually
advances the exact amount of the loss, damage or injury. The
insured regards the money as a satisfaction of the loss rather
than a loan which he must repay. As a businessman he wiLl un-
doubtedly make bookkeeping entries showing a payment and not
a loan. This "loan" is usually contingent upon recovery from the
third person, but the insurer is absolutely, not contingently, liable
to pay the loss to the insured under the policy as opposed to mak-
ing a loan for the loss. The most compelling argument is the fact
that the insurer retains control of the cause of action, and the
insured has little (in the case of partial coverage or payment)
or no legal interest in what occurs after the money has been
received from the insurer. 5
If more than lip service were given to the controlling factor
of true intention of the parties, the transfer of the money and the
real purpose of the loan system, its legal efficacy in the eyes of
the law, would obviously not be considered simply as a valid
exercise of liberty to contract or to be "consonant both with the
needs of commerce and the demands of justice."3 6
The substantive law is generally opposed to asserting the posi-
tion that the insurer is the real party in interest when the loan
receipt method is employed. Those cases that do overturn the
general rule are compelled to use the intent factor to pierce the
form. For example, in Scarborough v. Bartholomew3 7 the court
stated:
The view adopted by this court is that to give effect to
the literal words of such arrangements would amount to a
distortion of the true intentions of the parties concerned.
Viewed realistically and practically, there is no question but
that the insured does not regard himself as a debtor in any
sense of the word. Actually, he receives the money as com-
pensation for the loss suffered by him in the collision. He
34. Id. at 675-76.
35. Cf. Lydick v. Napier, 105 Ga. 820, 125 S.E.2d 701 (1962). It was held
that if the loan receipt does not purport to convey to the insurer authority to
bring suit on behalf of the insured, the inmsred must bring the suit himself and
can bar any attempt to bring it in his name without his authority.
36. Luckenbach v. W. 3. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139, 148 (1918).
37. 22 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1940), af-'d, 263 App. Div. 765, 30 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1941),
appeal denied, 263 App. Div. 905, 32 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1942).
19661
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certainly regards the payment as a payment of the loss under
the terms of the policy. That the insurance company does
not regard the arrangement as a loan is evidenced by the
inclusion of a provision in the loan receipt that the sum is a
"loan without interest, repayable only in the event and to
the extent of any net recovery the undersigned may make
from any person . . . liable for the loss. ... "88
New York has by statute permitted the insurer not to be joined
as the real party in interest 9 so that decisions such as Scar-
borough are no longer evident. However, the language in the
recent case of Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co.40 is extremely helpful in illustrating who
actually is the real party in interest in view of the party con-
trolling the action. The insured brought an action against the
insurer to determine whether the interest awarded on an amount
the insurer had paid the insured under a loan receipt should
be given to the insured or to the insurer. After reviewing the
documents, the court noted that the critical words in this dispute
were "borrowed" and "as a loan, without interest, repayable out
of net recovery." The court observed that the purpose and effect
of the loan receipt transaction was the typical insurance trans-
action: the insurer was to pay the loss, the insured was to receive
prompt payment, and the insurer was to be subrogated to the
third party claim to be prosecuted and controlled at his expense.
The court noted that a reading of the loan receipt alone would
not make this conclusion clear, but considering the insurance
policy, the proof of claim, the draft endorsement and the loan
receipt, it was clear that "the loan receipt transaction is not a
banking or financial operation but a device for the payment
absolute of an insurance loss, coupled with a fictional implemen-
tation to permit the insurer to sue in the name of the insured."41
Without the above-noted statute the insurer, not the insured,
would be the real party in interest as was held in the pre-statute
cases.42
38. Scarborough v. Bartholomew, 22 N.Y.S.2d 635, 638 (1940).
39. "Except where otherwise prescribed by order of the court, . . . [an] in-
sured person who has executed to his insurer either a loan receipt or subrogation
receipt, ... may sue or be sued without joining with him the person for or
against whose interest the action is brought" N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN., Civil
Prac. Lawv & Rules § 1004 (1963).
40. 21 App. Div. 2d 160, 249 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1964).
41. Id. at 165, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
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In Cleveland Paint & Color Co. v. Bauer Mfg. Co. 43 the citadel
of the loan receipt was again attacked successfully. The standard
loan receipt method was employed, and the Luckenbah case was
cited to support its validity. The court distinguished Luckenbach
on the obvious ground that the insurer's liability was contingent
rather than absolute. Destroying the fiction by the obvious intent
of the transaction, the court held that the insurer and not the
insured was the real party in interest.
This Ohio case was logically followed in a different factual
circumstance in Young v. Drive It YourseZf, Inc.,44 where an
action was brought by the driver of a rented automobile against
the owner for breach of an insurance contract. This contract had
indemnified the driver against loss as a result of an accident
which occurred while he was driving the automobile. The driver's
own insurance coverage was the excess over other valid and col-
lectible insurance available to him, and he had "borrowed" money
from his carrier to pay the judgments against him. The trial
court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss, saying that
the insurer was the real party in interest under the authority of
Bauer. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that this
insurer's liability was contingent because it was an excess insur-
ance carrier, and therefore, it was not absolutely liable to pay
for a loss. Thus, the distinction made in Bauer was upheld, and
the driver-insured was the proper party to bring the action.
This contingency distinction was also recognized where the
loan receipt was considered for the first time by the Alabama
Supreme Court.45 The Luckenbah case had been cited, but the
court quoted with approval the following language of a New
York case which proposed an interesting hypothetical. "The
plaintiff is required to repay 'the loan' only in the event that he
recovers of this defendant. Suppose he fails to recover and sues
the insurer on the policy for his damage, would the insurer still
say he intended to make a loan, not a payment?" 46
Regardless of the logic behind the policy, the loan receipt is
entrenched in the substantive law. The only practical method to
43. 155 Ohio St. 17, 97 N.E2d 545 (1951). In 25 TamP. L.Q. 224 (1951) this
case was criticized by emphasizing the policy reason for speedy payment as
set forth in Luckenbach v. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
The analysis overlooked the contingent versus absolute payment theory dis-
cussed in the Bauer case.
44. 115 Ohio App. 307, 20 Ohio Ops. 2d 380, 184 N.E.2d 912 (1961).
45. McKenzie v. North River Ins. Co., 257 Ala. 265, 58 So. 2d 581 (1951).
46. Id. at 583, quoting from Yezek v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R.,
176 Misc. 553, 28 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38 (1941).
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attack the validity of the insured's being the real party in inter-
est seems to be through the "intent" factors. It is submitted that
most of the executed loan receipts will follow the normal pattern
of payment of the usual insurance coverage, and more import-
antly the parties will regard the transaction as payment of an
insurance loss. By reviewing the records of the insurer and in-
sured, the transaction will reflect the intent of the parties re-
gardless of the form employed to settle the loss. The facts in the
Condor Inv. case will undoubtedly parallel most loan receipt
transactions. Hopefully, the reasoning applied to those facts will
naturally follow when brought to the attention of an alert
court.
47
It would appear further that the purpose of Rule 17(a) and
subrogation principles discussed in the Aetna case should be ap-
plicable in piercing the mantle of the loan receipt and discern-
ing the true intent of the real party in interest. With such an
interpretation there would be little difference in result evidenced
by the loan receipt and by the normal principles of subrogation.
To attack this method properly, the records of the entire trans-
action must be reviewed. In order to avoid the automatic effect
of stare decisis, the attack can be oriented to the particular facts
of the case. It is submitted, however, that both approaches should
be made: (1) attack the general principle of the loan receipt,
and (2) attack the loan receipt in the particular factual pattern.
Depending on the liberality of the court, the first argument can
be used to enforce the validity of the second, i.e., "even if loan
receipts are valid and effective, in this particular case it is ob-
vious that this was not the intent of the parties as evidenced by
the records." The success of an attack on this method of settling
the loss to the insured and thus evading the intent of Rule 17(a),
depends upon a thorough presentation of the facts by the oppos-
47. Some courts have so blindly followed the loan receipt theory that no dis-
cussion was deemed warranted. For example, in a District of Columbia case,
Oliff v. Mount Vernon Seminary, Inc., 22 Fed. Rules Ser. 17a, 14, Case 2
(1956), the plaintiff was an employee of Hessick, Inc., and was injured while
delivering oil to the defendant's premises. The defendant moved to bring in the
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., the compensation carrier for Hessick, as an
additional party plaintiff under Rule 17(a). The defendant stated that Aetna
was a necessary party since it had by letter informed the defendant that it was
claiming full reimbursement for all expenses which it, Aetna, had incurred as
a result of the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff opposed the motion on the
ground that the insurer was not a real party in interest since money given to
the plaintiff was advanced voluntarily as a loan which this plaintiff had agreed
to repay, and the insurer had no interest whatsoever in the claim of the plain-
tiff. Without any comment, the court sustained the plaintiff's position by simply
citing MooRE, FEnmAL. PRArcE (2d ed. 1964) and the cases therein listed.
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ing counsel. It must be clearly shown that slavish adherence to
stare decisis is not consonant with reason and justice in view of
the established subrogation policies and the purpose of the real
party in interest rule.
The relative merits of whether an insurance company suffers
undue prejudice before a jury is outside the scope of this discus-
sion and, when analyzing loan receipts, should be outside any
consideration of the real party in interest under Rule 17(a).
New York has resolved this question by statute48 providing that
an insurance company is not the real party in interest under a
loan receipt and thereby abrogating the substantive law which
held that the insurance company was the real party in interest.49
New York at least has recognized the subterfuge under the loan
receipt and has applied the proper remedy to the problem com-
plained of by the insurers. Justice Holmes once observed that
"fiction always is a poor ground for changing substantial
rights."50 The fiction which has been perpetuated since Lucken-
lacA is indeed a "poor ground" for avoiding the clear purpose of
Rule 17(a) and should be so recognized by the courts. If the
result of having the insurer before the jury as the named real
party in interest invokes injustice, the remedy should be sought
in the legislature and not in the courthouse.
48. N.Y. CoNsoL LAWS ANN., Civil Prac. Law & Rules § 1004 (1963).
49. Scarborough v. Bartholomew, 22 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1940), aff'd, 263 App.
Div. 765, 30 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1941).
50. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 630 (1906) (dissenting opinion).
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